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Note
Should Federal Regulation Eliminate Defenses to
Criminal Prosecution? The Viability of Implied
Authorization and Participant Benefit Defenses When
Read in Light of ERISA
Christopher Stall*
William Mett founded Center Art Galleries (CAG) in 1973,
serving as the gallery's president and sole shareholder.' In
1977, CAG established two employee pension plans, which were
funded by company contributions 2 and were subject to regula-
tion under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 (ERISA).3 Mett and CAG's vice president, Marvin Wise-
man,4 served as trustees for the plans, and both officers met
the definition of a plan fiduciary under ERISA.5 After CAG suf-
fered several major financial setbacks,6 Mett and Wiseman
* J.D. Candidate 2000, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. Carle-
ton College, 1992. The author would like to thank Janice Symchych for her
assistance and extremely helpful commentary. The author would also like to
thank Natalie Wyatt-Brown for her encouragement and support.
1. See United States v. Mett, 178 F.3d 1058, 1060 (9th Cir. 1999).
2. See id.
3. Both plans were defined benefit plans, subject to the provisions of the
ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1046 (1994 & Supp. III 1997). See Mett, 178 F.3d at
1060. Passed in 1974, ERISA created a variety of rights, obligations, and
remedies for employers offering employee benefits. See Jeffrey A. Brauch, The
Federal Common Law of ERISA, 21 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POLY 541, 546-49
(1998). First, it imposed detailed disclosure requirements meant to notify par-
ticipants of their rights. See id.; 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1031. Second, ERISA set
standards for plan fiduciaries, who exercise control over the plan. See 29
U.S.C. §§ 1002(21)(A), 1104, 1109 (1998); Brauch, supra, at 547. Third, it set
vesting, benefit accrual, and funding standards for pension plans. See 29
U.S.C. §§ 1051-1061, 1081-1086; Brauch, supra, at 547-48. Fourth, ERISA
enumerated federal criminal and civil penalties for violations of its reporting,
disclosure, and other fiduciary responsibilities. See Brauch, supra, at 547-48.
4. Wiseman served as vice president in charge of staff training and art
acquisition. See Mett, 178 F.3d at 1060-61.
5. See id.
6. In 1990, Mett, Wiseman, and CAG were convicted of felony art fraud
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withdrew approximately $1.6 million from the pension plans
and deposited the funds into the business's general operating
account.7 The company neither informed its employees of this
transaction nor made proper disclosures to the Internal Reve-
nue Service or to the Department of Labor.8
After a Department of Labor investigation, both Mett and
Wiseman were indicted for embezzlement 9 of funds from an
employee benefit plan.10 A central issue at trial was whether
defendants had the requisite intent to be convicted under the
federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 664, which criminalizes theft and
embezzlement from an employee benefit plan." Both Mett and
due to CAG sales practices. See id. at 1061. These convictions, as well as a
general downturn in the Hawaiian economy, created significant cash shortfalls
for CAG. See id.
7. See id.
8. See id. at 1061-62. Plan fiduciaries are required to file an annual re-
port (an IRS form 5500) with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) for qualified
defined benefit plans. See 29 C.F.R. § 2520.103-1 (1999). The IRS shares
these reports with the Department of Labor. See Charles L. Lerner & Virginia
C. Smith, Department of Labor ERISA Enforcement, in ALI-ABA COURSE OF
STUDY, INVESTMENT ADVISER REGULATION 281, 283-84 (1999). The Depart-
ment of Labor uses this information, among other uses, to select cases for en-
forcement investigations. See id. at 288. The Department of Labor is empow-
ered to impose civil penalties for the failure to file a Form 5500 pursuant to
§ 502(c)(2) of ERISA. See id. at 285 (noting that penalties may reach up to
$1,000 per day the plan fiduciary fails to file).
9. Embezzlement is a statutory crime and its elements can vary from ju-
risdiction to jurisdiction. See WAYNE LAFAVE & A. SCOTr, CRIMINAL LAW 644-
45 (1972). Embezzlement may be generally defined as (1) the fraudulent (2)
conversion of (3) the property (4) of another (5) by one who already has lawful
possession of it. See id.
10. The defendants were charged with sixteen counts. See Mett, 178 F.3d
at 1061. These included embezzling from a pension benefit plan under 18
U.S.C. § 664 (1994), misappropriating assets of a pension benefit plan under
18 U.S.C. § 371, unlawfully serving as trustee after being convicted of a felony
under 29 U.S.C. § 1111 (1994), and filing a false annual report in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 1027. See Mett, 178 F.3d at 1061.
11. 18 U.S.C. § 664 consolidates larceny and embezzlement into a single
statutory offense. It provides:
Any person who embezzles, steals, or unlawfully and willfully ab-
stracts or converts to his own use or the use of another, any of the
moneys, funds, securities, premiums, credits, property, or other assets
of any employee welfare benefit plan, or employee pension benefit
plan, or of any fund connected therewith, shall be fined under this ti-
tle, or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 664. Although embezzlement is stated as an alternative way to
violate § 664, the statute does not define what it means to embezzle. See id.
This is somewhat unusual, as embezzlement was never a common law crime,
but only a statutory crime. See 3 CHARLES E. TORCIA, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL
LAW, 400-02, nn.4-8 (14th ed. 1980); LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 9, at 644-
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Wiseman sought to negate the government's showing of the
requisite specific intent.12 They argued that they lacked crimi-
nal culpability because they had merely borrowed the money in
order to maintain CAG's operations.' 3
Mett and Wiseman attempted to assert a two-prong de-
fense to negate the specific intent requirement. First, the de-
fendants argued they had implied authorization from the em-
ployees to use the pension money.' 4 To support this contention,
they argued that since "the CAG employees [were] more con-
cerned with the survival of the company than with illegal uses
of their pension funds, [they] implicitly [had] authorized the
pension fund withdrawals."15 Second, Mett and Wiseman ar-
gued the withdrawals were made in the best interest of the
employees. Under this theory of participant benefit, they ar-
gued that the withdrawals were made to rescue the employees
from impending unemployment.' 6 The trial court rejected
45.
Section 664 concludes:
As used in this section, the term "any employee welfare benefit
plan or employee pension benefit plan" means any employee benefit
plan subject to any provision of title I [29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1191 (1994
& Supp. III 1997)] of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974.
Id. Therefore, this section generally applies to any employee pension plan or
employee welfare subject to regulation under ERISA provisions 29 U.S.C.
§3 1001-1191.
12. See Mett, 178 F.3d at 1066. When interpreting the embezzlement pro-
visions of 18 U.S.C. § 664, federal courts have held that the defendant must
convert property with intent to defraud. See United States v. Andreen, 628
F.2d 1236, 1241 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that the act must be done with a
fraudulent intent or a bad purpose or an evil motive); see also United States v.
Busacca, 936 F.2d 232, 239-40 (6th Cir. 1991).
Generally, a person commits embezzlement when, while lawfully in the
possession of the property of another, he appropriates or converts such prop-
erty to himself or use of another with the intent to permanently deprive the
owner of the property. See 2 F. LEE BAILEY & HENRY B. ROTHBLATT,
DEFENDING BUSINESS AND WHITE COLLAR CRIMES FEDERAL AND STATE § 25.1
(2d ed. 1984); 3 TORCIA, supra note 11, § 395. The essence of embezzlement is
therefore a conversion of property with criminal intent. See 2 BAILEY &
ROTHBLATT, supra, § 25.13; 3 TORCIA, supra note 11, § 395.
13. See Linda Hosek, Art Gallery Execs Get Six Years, HONOLULU STAR
BUL., Nov. 11, 1997, at 1, available at <http://starbulletin.com/97/Il/07/news/
story3.html>. This argument may have been undercut by the fact that Mett
and Wiseman drew $378,000 and $515,000 in salaries in years 1990-92 despite
CAG's financial difficulties. See id.





these arguments, and Mett and Wiseman were convicted. 17 On
appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded the case for a
new trial on other grounds,18 but held that neither the implied
authorization nor the participant benefit theory could be pre-
sented in the retrial to negate criminal intent.19
The Mett court departed from prior precedent interpreting
§ 66420 when it foreclosed the implied authorization and par-
ticipant benefit defenses for § 664 embezzlement prosecutions.
Other circuits have been much more liberal in allowing these
defenses.21 This Note examines the differing judicial treatment
of the implied authorization and participant benefit defenses in
§ 664 prosecutions. Part I examines the criminal provisions of
18 U.S.C. § 664, discusses the recent enforcement efforts of the
Department of Justice and Department of Labor, and explores
the regulatory structure of ERISA. Part I then examines how
judicial interpretations of § 501 of the Labor Management Re-
lations Disclosure Act (LMRDA)22 have influenced the devel-
opment of the authorization and participant benefit defenses
under 18 U.S.C. § 664.
17. See id. at 1060; Hosek, supra note 13, at 1.
18. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the trial court
had improperly admitted evidence protected by the attorney-client privilege.
See Mett, 178 F.3d at 1064-67 (holding the trial court had misconstrued the
fiduciary exception to the attorney-client privilege).
19. See id. at 1067. In dicta, the Mett court held that, as a general rule,
"facts pertaining to authorization and benefit... may be relevant to the ques-
tion of intent." Id. at 1068. However, the Mett court held that neither defense
was available in this case. See id. It held that implied authorization failed
because employees lacked the ability to authorize such a diversion of pension
funds. See id. (holding that the policies of ERISA and its anti-alienation pro-
visions prevent participants from assigning or alienating plan funds). The
court also held that ERISA's strict fiduciary standards precluded use of the
participant benefit defense since it concluded that plan fiduciaries could not
substitute a short-term benefit (continuing employment) for a long-term bene-
fit (retirement income). See id.; infra notes 146-49, 168-72 and accompanying
text.
20. Compare United States v. Todd, 108 F.3d 1329, 1329-30 (11th Cir.
1997), with Mett, 178 F.3d at 1067.
21. See United States v. Nolan, 136 F.3d 265, 269 (2d Cir. 1998) (allowing
the authorization and benefit defenses to be used in a § 664 prosecution for
embezzlement); Todd, 108 F.3d at 1329-30 (allowing the authorization and
benefit defenses to be used in a § 664 prosecution for embezzlement); cf.
United States v. Dixon, 609 F.2d 827, 828-29 (5th Cir. 1980) (allowing
authorization and participant benefit theories to be offered as defenses in em-
bezzlement prosecution under 29 U.S.C. § 501(c)); United States v. Ottley, 509
F.2d 667, 671 (2d Cir. 1975).
22. 29 U.S.C. § 501 (1994).
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Part II analyzes the viability of the implied authorization
and participant benefit defenses, by examining what role the
civil provisions of ERISA should play in interpreting 18 U.S.C.
§ 664. This Note argues that while civil regulation should not
be the basis for criminal liability itself, such regulation has a
bearing on the state of mind of the defendant. Accordingly, this
Note suggests the circuit split should be resolved by allowing
the implied authorization and participant benefits defense to be
offered, but limiting the applicability of the defense by requir-
ing the factfinder to judge the reasonableness of the defense
though the objective standard of the civil regulations ERISA.
I. CIVIL AND CRIMINAL REGULATION OF EMPLOYEE
BENEFITS UNDER ERISA
Congress enacted ERISA to provide a comprehensive
regulatory scheme for employee benefit plans.23 Under ERISA,
the federal government exercises exclusive control over the
regulation of employee benefit plans.24 The Department of La-
bor (DOL) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) exercise this
control through an interlocking system of civil and criminal en-
forcement.25
A. THE PENSION ABUSE INITIATIVE: PURSUIT OF CRIMINAL
RATHER THAN CIVIL REMEDIES
Federal embezzlement cases such as Mett have become in-
creasingly common as the DOL and the DOJ have cracked
down on pension and welfare plan abuses. In May 1997, Attor-
ney General Janet Reno and Labor Secretary Alexis Herman
jointly announced that their departments had begun a nation-
wide pension-fraud enforcement initiative.26 Reno stated that
the crackdown was designed to preserve the integrity of the es-
timated $3.5 trillion private pension plan system.27 The Pen-
sion Abuse Initiative has placed great emphasis on criminal
23. See Brauch, supra note 3, at 541.
24. See FRANK J. BITZER & NICHOLAS W. FERRIGNO, ERISA FACTS 631-
32, 731-33 (1999).
25. See id.
26. See John W. Lundquist & Debra J. Linder, When the Deposit Isn't
Made: Abuse of Pension Fund Accounts Is a Crime, BUS. L. TODAY, Oct. 1998,
at 55-56.
27. See id. Reno said, "[als Americans grow more dependent on retire-
ment income from pensions, it is important that they feel confident that their
investments remain safe and secure." Id. at 55.
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prosecution for misappropriation of pension assets and has at-
tempted to coordinate efforts by federal agencies to curb pen-
sion abuses.28
The initiative has also focused on the failure of businesses
to make contributions to retirement plans.29 In these cases, the
government prosecutes the business for failing to remit money
to the plan, rather than for diverting money from the plan ac-
count. Because this initiative has focused on plan protection
rather than criminal culpability, individuals have been prose-
cuted for embezzlement even when they received no direct per-
sonal benefit.30 In 1998, for instance, the DOJ brought four
such prosecutions in Minnesota. 31 Each of these prosecutions
was notable because the pension funds were not directly di-
verted to the benefit of the business owners.32 Instead, these
funds were retained in the businesses' general operating ac-
counts and used for general operating expenses. 33
The government generally targets for prosecution busi-
nesses sponsoring qualified plans34 and officers of the busi-
28. See id. at 55-56. Within the first eight months of the initiative, 70
criminal cases involving more than $90 million in losses were initiated. See
Hanover Businessman Guilty of Pension Theft, PATRIOT LEDGER (Quincy,
Mass.), June 9, 1997, at 26; Pension-Fraud Crackdown, WASH. TIMES, May 16,
1997, at B8; U.S. Crackdown on Pension Fraud, DES MOINES REGISTER, May
16, 1997, at 9; U.S. Dep't of Labor, Press Release: Labor and Justice Depart-
ments Announce Crackdown on Pension Abuse (visited Oct. 15, 1999)
<http'//www.dol.gov/dol]opa/public/media/press/opa/opa97166htm>. The gov-
ernment has applied criminal liability broadly to remedy breaches of trust by
plan sponsors and fiduciaries, such as by imposing criminal sanctions for even
relatively small infractions. For instance, the DOJ has prosecuted employers
for failing to remit as little as $6,100 to a plan. See J. Cheek, Pension Abuse
Initiative Highlights, (visited Mar. 6, 2000) <http'/www.cpaspan.com/pfraud.
htm> (convicting John E. Flynn, Jr., the president of a Boston-based engi-
neering company, of embezzlement for failing to forward $6,100 to the com-
pany's 401(k) plan).
29. Employers have been held criminally liable for failure to timely remit
payroll deductions and employer contributions to the plan. See Lundquist &




33. See id. Additionally, the DOJ and DOL have pursued criminal sanc-
tions against business owners even when they have not drawn a salary from
the business. See id.
34. The term qualified plan refers to employee welfare or pension plans
that meet the requirements of§ 401(a) of the Internal Revenue Code. See gen-
erally STEPHAN R. LEIMBERG & JOHN J. MCFADDEN, THE TOOLS &
TECHNIQUES OF EMPLOYEE BENEFIT AND RETIREMENT PLANNING 195-205
(5th ed. 1997). Qualified plans, also known as qualified pension trusts, receive
1842 [Vol. 84:1837
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nesses who qualify as ERI1A "fiduciaries."35 Prosecutors can
bring charges for theft or embezzlement 36 and for making false
statements in relationship to plan documents. 37 "[Tihe gov-
ernment's theory is that a fiduciary converts plan assets when-
ever payroll withholdings are not promptly deposited into the
authorized plan account."38 That is, the DOL and DOJ consider
earmarked money to be a plan asset prior to its deposit with
the plan. Because ERISA prohibits other uses of plan assets or
benefits, 39 the failure to deposit the funds with the plan in a
timely manner constitutes a conversion of plan assets.
40 Al-
preferential tax treatment under the Internal Revenue Code. See id.; I.R.C.
§ 501(a) (explaining the tax-exempt status of qualified plans). The qualifica-
tions for special tax treatment generally include establishment of a plan for
the exclusive benefit of employees or their beneficiaries, meeting contribution
requirements, and complying with nondiscriminatory, participation and vest-
ing standards. See 26 I.R.C. § 401(a) (stating the requirements for qualified
plans). See generally 47A C.J.S. Internal Revenue § 276(1) (2000).
35. See Lundquist & Linder, supra note 26, at 55-56. ERISA defines "fi-
duciary" as follows:
[A] person is a fiduciary with respect to a plan to the extent... he ex-
ercises any discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting
management of such plan or exercises any authority or control re-
specting management or disposition of its assets,... he renders in-
vestment advice for a fee or other compensation, direct or indirect,
with respect to any moneys or other property of such plan, or has any
authority or responsibility to do so, or... he has any discretionary
authority or discretionary responsibility in the administration of such
plan.
29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (1994); see also 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-21 (1999) (providing
a definition of "fiduciary"); Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 517 U.S. 882, 890 (1996)
(finding support for the rule that employers who "'adopt, modify, or terminate'
plans act as settlors, not fiduciaries, in ERISA's definition of a fiduciary
(quoting Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonegongen, 514 U.S. 73 (1995))).
36. See 18 U.S.C. § 664 (1994) (prohibiting theft and embezzlement from
employee benefit plans).
37. See 18 U.S.C. § 1027 (prohibiting false statements and concealment of
facts with regards to ERISA documents).
38. Lundquist & Linder, supra note 26, at 56.
39. ERISA provides that "[elach pension plan shall provide that benefits
provided under the plan may not be assigned or alienated." 29 U.S.C.
§ 1056(d)(1). Treasury regulations also prohibit involuntary transfers from
qualified plans by requiring that "benefits provided under the plan may not be
anticipated, assigned... alienated or subject to attachment, garnishment,
levy execution or other legal or equitable process." 26 C.F.R. § 1.401(a)-
(13)(b)(1) (1999).
40. See Lundquist & Linder, supra note 26, at 56. Similarly, the govern-
ment has argued that any document constitutes a false statement if it indi-
cates contributions were made to the plan but the funds are not actually de-
posited in the plan account. See id.
2000] 1843
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though civil remedies are available,4 the DOL and DOJ have
chosen to broadly apply the criminal code to deter and punish
breaches of fiduciary trust.
B. EMBEZZLEMENT UNDER 18 U.S.C. § 664 AND THE OTHER
PROVISIONS OF ERISA
Although the embezzlement provision was added to the
criminal code rather than to ERISA provisions, 42 understand-
ing the provisions of ERISA is critical in interpreting the provi-
sions of 18 U.S.C. § 664. To be convicted under § 664, a defen-
dant must take, abstract, or convert some asset 43 from an
"employee welfare benefit plan or employee pension benefit
plan."4 The provision goes on to define this phrase as "any
employee benefit plan subject to any provision of title I of the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974."45 Some
courts extensively rely on the regulatory provisions of ERISA
not only to understand the duties of fiduciaries, but also to un-
derstand the objective expectations of parties and guide the ap-
plication of policy in prosecutions under § 664.46 Some courts
have also taken this language to mean that ERISA should be
used as a source of interpretive guidance for § 664 prosecu-
tions.47
41. For example, the DOL can pursue collection of delinquent contribu-
tions, plus interest and penalties, for breach of fiduciary trust. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 1132 (providing for civil enforcement).
42. The embezzlement provision was inserted into 18 U.S.C. § 664
whereas the provisions of ERISA are contained in 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461.
43. Section 664 requires that the defendant expropriate "any of the mon-
eys, funds, securities, premiums, credits, property, or other assets" of the plan
or any fund connected with the plan. 18 U.S.C. § 664.
44. Id.; see supra note 11 (providing the complete text of 18 U.S.C. § 664).
45. 18 U.S.C. § 664.
46. See, e.g., United States v. Mett, 178 F.3d 1058, 1067-68 (9th Cir. 1999)
(holding that the regulatory policies and provisions of ERISA prevented the
defendant from offering either the implied authorization or participant benefit
defenses in a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 664). But see United States v.
Nolan, 136 F.3d 265, 269 (2d Cir. 1998) (interpreting 18 U.S.C § 664 without
reference to ERISA); United States v. Todd, 108 F.3d 1329, 1329-31 (11th Cir.
1997) (interpreting § 664 without reference to ERISA).
47. See, e.g., Mett, 178 F.3d at 1067-68; United States v. Snyder, 668 F.2d
686, 690-91 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding that the prosecution was allowed to offer
evidence that the defendant knew he was violating the civil provision of
ERISA when charged with embezzlement under 18 U.S.C. § 664). But see
Nolan, 136 F.3d at 269-70 (ignoring the civil provisions of ERISA in address-
ing the applicability of authorization and benefit defenses when the defendant
was charged with embezzlement under 18 U.S.C. § 664); Todd, 108 F.3d at
[Vol. 84:18371844
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1. 18 U.S.C. § 664: Adding Prosecutorial Teeth to ERISA
Regulation
Section 664 came into existence as part of the 1962
amendments to the Welfare and Pension Plan Disclosure Act of
1958.48 The House Report, supporting the passage of this stat-
ute, emphasized that prior to the enactment of criminal sanc-
tions, self-policing through suits by plan beneficiaries had
failed to protect the integrity of employee welfare plans.49 To
cure this frailty, Congress granted the Labor Secretary expan-
sive power to pursue civil actions against plan fiduciaries,
promulgate regulations, and issue rules and interpretations to
guide plan administrators. 50 In addition, Congress created
three new federal felonies to be added to Title 18 of the United
States Code. These new provisions prohibited accepting or
giving kickbacks, knowingly making false statements or con-
cealing any fact, and theft or embezzlement of plan assets.51
The House Report emphasized that these provisions were
meant to protect plan beneficiaries by curbing abuses through
punishment to deter future violations of the Act.52
The original version of § 664 was nearly identical to the
provisions of the Code today.53 It conditioned liability on con-
version of assets from any "plan subject to the provisions of the
Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act."54 With the passage
of ERISA in 1974, this language was changed to "any employee
benefit plan subject to any provision of title I" of ERISA.55
1329-31.
48. See H.R. REP. No. 87-998, pt. 1 (1962), reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1532, 1532-33.
49. See id. pt. 3, reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1535-36. Prior to the
1958 amendments, retirement plan participants could file suit against plan
fiduciaries for breach of trust. See id. The DOL was largely powerless to
punish offenders. See id.
50. See id. pt. 4, reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1537-38.
51. See id. These provisions were later codified in 18 U.S.C. § 664.
52. See id. pt. 3, reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1536.
53. Section 664 has been amended twice since its passage. See Violent
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108
Stat. 1796 (1994); Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L.
No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (prior to 1994 amendment). For the purposes
of this discussion, only the 1974 amendment is significant.
54. Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act Amendments of 1962, § 17,
Pub. L. No. 87-420, 76 Stat. 35 (1962) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 664 (1963)).
55. 18 U.S.C. § 664 (1994). This change in language was necessary be-
cause ERISA supplanted the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act. See
generally ERISA, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 76 Stat. 829 (1974).
18452000]
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With this amendment, § 664 became subject to the complicated
provisions and policies of ERISA.
2. Definition of'"Plan Assets" Subject to 18 U.S.C. § 664
To be guilty of embezzlement under 18 U.S.C. § 664, the
plan sponsor or a plan fiduciary must take something of value
from an "employee welfare benefit plan or employee pension
benefit plan" subject to Title I of ERISA.56 Funds deposited in
a plan account 57 are considered "plan assets."58 However, it is
unclear whether funds earmarked to be deposited in an em-
ployee benefit plan account are subject to Title I of ERISA, be-
cause the statute fails to define the term "plan assets."59
In 1997, pursuant to its rule-making authority, the De-
partment of Labor promulgated a new regulation defining "plan
assets."60 This regulation mandated that moneys become plan
assets at the "earliest date on which such contributions can
reasonably be segregated from the employer's general assets."6 1
This regulation reduced the time period in which plan sponsors
must make pension plan deposits.62 Deposits must now be
made no later than fifteen business days after the month in
which the participant contributed amounts received by the em-
ployer or such amounts would have otherwise been payable.6 3
56. 18 U.S.C. § 664. Generally, ERISA applies to any employee benefit
plan described in § 1003(a) and not excluded under § 1003(b) of ERISA. See 29
U.S.C. § 1101(a) (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
57. This assumes the plan is subject to ERISA, under 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a)-
(b) (1994). See supra note 56.
58. 29 U.S.C. §1101(a)-(b) (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
59. See John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris Trust & Say. Bank, 510
U.S. 86, 90 (1993). Whereas ERISA fails to define "plan assets," Congress ex-
empted "guaranteed benefit polic[ies]" from the definition of plan assets under
29 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(2).
60. See 29 C.F.R § 2510.3-102 (1999). The DOL has rule-making author-
ity under 29 U.S.C. § 1101(c)(1)(A).
61. 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-102(a). "[Plan assets] include amounts ... that a
participant or beneficiary pays to an employer, or amounts that a participant
has withheld from his wages by an employer, for contribution to the plan as of
the earliest date on which such contributions can reasonably be segregated
from the employer's general assets." Id.
62. See 29 C.F.R § 2510.3-102(b)(1). Prior to 1997, the employer had 90
days to make such contributions. See Lundquist & Linder, supra note 26, at
56.
63. See Lundquist & Linder, supra note 26, at 56. There is one exception
to the 15-day general rule. The time frame for making contributions to a
SIMPLE plan, defined in I.R.C. § 408(p) (1994), is longer than for other types
of retirement plans. Compare 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-102(b)(1) (setting out the
1846 [Vol. 84:1837
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Although this regulation is consistent with DOL's aggressive
stance toward pension protection, it has no practical import for
prosecutions, because it states that it is "without any implica-
tion for and may not be relied upon to bar criminal prosecu-
tions."64
Federal courts have also taken an expansive view of what
constitutes plan assets. In prosecutions under 18 U.S.C. § 664,
courts have been unreceptive to arguments that employee de-
ductions and earmarked employer contributions should not be
considered plan assets before they are deposited in a plan ac-
count.65 Courts have continued to emphasize that the primary
policy of ERISA is the preservation of the integrity of employee
benefits plans for the financial security of employees. 66 Such a
policy supports a broad interpretation of what constitutes plan
assets. The majority of courts that have addressed the issue
have held that "plan assets" encompass employee withholdings
and employer contributions owed to employee benefit plans.67
The United States Supreme Court has also narrowly inter-
general rule), with 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-102(b)(2) (providing the exception for
SIMPLE plans). Sponsors of SIMPLE plans must make their deposits no later
than the 30th day following the month in which the participant contribution
amounts would otherwise have been payable to the participant. See 29 C.F.R.
§ 2510.3-102(b)(2). "SIMPLE" is an acronym for savings incentive match plan
for employees. See LEIMBERG & MCFADDEN, supra note 34, at 159; 47A C.J.S.
Internal Revenue § 293(1) (2000). Under this type of plan, employees reduce
their salaries and the proceeds are deposited into the plan as tax-deferred con-
tributions. See LEIMBERG & MCFADDEN, supra note 34, at 159-60; 47A C.J.S.
Internal Revenue § 293(1) (2000).
64. 29 C.F.R § 2510.3-102(a) (emphasis added).
65. See United States v. Grizzle, 933 F.2d 943, 946-47 (11th Cir. 1991)
(holding that the special duties imposed by ERISA, federal regulations, and
the parties' agreements indicate that funds withheld from employees are plan
assets); United States v. Panepinto, 818 F. Supp. 48, 50 (E.D.N.Y. 1993), affd,
28 F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that § 664 "plainly evinces an intent
broadly to protect the wealth of employee welfare benefit plans ... the lan-
guage of the statute, by its terms, does not limit its reach to protecting only
wealth already transferred to a welfare benefit plan or its administrators"); cf
United States v. Lasky, 967 F. Supp. 749, 753 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that
once employee payments are collected they are plan assets for the purposes of
applicability of Title I of ERISA for an 18 U.S.C. § 661 embezzlement prosecu-
tion). But see Young v. West Coast Indus. Relations Ass'n, 763 F. Supp. 64,
74-76 (D. Del. 1991), affd, 961 F.2d 1570 (3rd Cir. 1992) (holding that an em-
ployer's failure to contribute did not constitute embezzlement where such fail-
ure rendered the employer liable for "all arrears in payment... attorney fees,
court costs," liquidated damages, and other costs and where no contractual
provision existed indicating when money paid became vested).
66. See generally cases cited supra note 65.
67. See cases cited supra note 65.
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preted a statutory exclusion from "plan asset" in John Hancock
Mutual Life Insurance v. Harris Trust & Savings Bank.6 8 In
Hancock, the Court rejected an insurance company's claim that
its products were not subject to regulation under ERISA, hold-
ing that the exclusions to regulation should be narrowly tai-
lored to protect workers. 69
3. Duties of Plan Fiduciaries Under ERISA
Once it has been determined that funds qualify as plan as-
sets, ERISA regulates the duties of fiduciaries and plan spon-
sors who manage and distribute plan assets. In addition to
providing a comprehensive regulatory scheme for employee
benefit plans and establishing detailed disclosure requirements
meant to notify participants of their rights,70 ERISA also sets
standards for plan fiduciaries, who exercise control over the
plan.71 It sets "vesting, benefit accrual, and funding standards"
for pension plans that plan fiduciaries and sponsors must fol-
low.7 2 Finally, ERISA enumerates federal criminal and civil
penalties for violations of its reporting, disclosure, and various
other fiduciary responsibilities.7 3 Of primary importance to
§ 664 cases are fiduciary duties, notification requirements, and
anti-alienation provisions of the statute.
Fiduciaries 74 and plan sponsors must act "solely in the in-
terest of the participants and beneficiaries and for the exclusive
purpose of providing benefits to participants and their benefici-
aries."75 ERISA prohibits self-dealing and conflict of interest
transactions.7 6 For example, the statute forbids the sale or ex-
68. 510 U.S. 86, 90, 97-101 (1993). Congress prescribed an exception from
ERISA for "guaranteed benefit polic[ies]" under 29 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(2). See
John Hancock, 510 U.S. at 90, 98-99.
69. Consistent with the policy to protect employees, the Court rejected an
insurance company's claim that its policy was not subject to ERISA. See John
Hancock, 510 U.S. at 90, 98-99.
70. See Brauch, supra note 3, at 547-48 (citing 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1021-1031
(1994 & West Supp. 1998)).
71. See id. at 547-48 (citing 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1002(21)(A), 1109 (1994); 29
U.S.C.A. § 1104 (1994 & West Supp. 1998)).
72. See id. (citing 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1051-1061, 1081-1086 (1994 & West
Supp. 1998)).
73. See id.
74. See supra note 35 (quoting the definition of a plan fiduciary under 29
U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)). The obligations of an ERISA fiduciary are described in
29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (1994).
75. 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (a)(1).
76. See id. § 1106.
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change, or leasing of property; the lending of money or exten-
sion of credit; and the furnishing of goods or services between a
plan and a party of interest.7 7 A party of interest is broadly de-
fined to include plan fiduciaries, persons providing services to
the plan, the employer, its owner, or any relative or affiliated
business entity of any the above parties.78 Generally, such a
party must petition the Secretary of Labor to be allowed an ex-
emption from prohibited transactions.79 Before an exemption
may be granted, the Secretary must publish a notice in the
Federal Register and allow interested parties adequate time to
respond.80
ERISA places a premium on the duty of plan fiduciaries to
report and disclose information to both the government and
plan beneficiaries.8' Accordingly, ERISA devotes ten sections
to reporting and disclosure requirements,8 2 requiring over
twenty-seven different types of reports and disclosures to be
made to the DOL, the IRS, and plan participants.8 3 These dis-
closure and notice requirements help to:
[1] Make sure that sure plan participants and beneficiaries know
their rights under ERISA; [21 Ensure that plan participants and bene-
ficiaries are provided the information necessary to make informed de-
cisions concerning their benefit options; [3] Encourage employers to
comply with ERISA by making public the transactions of plans and
their fiduciaries and administrators; and [4] Assist government agen-
cies in meeting their enforcement obligations under ERISA.9'
Each of the basic reporting requirements furthers one or more
of these goals.8 5
77. See id. § 1106(a)(1).
78. See id. § 1002(14).
79. See id. § 1108(a).
80. See id. There is also a narrow class of enumerated exemptions from
prohibited transactions in section 408(b) of ERISA. See id. § 1108(b). Gener-
ally, these transactions have a low risk for breach of trust. One of the most
commonly exercised exemptions is an employee borrowing from a defined con-
tribution plan.
81. See Janae L. Schaeffer et al., Reporting and Disclosure, in ERISA
BAsIcs: A PRIMER ON ERISA ISSUES 3 (1998). During the hearing process
prior to the enactment of ERISA, it became clear that plan participants gener-
ally lacked accurate information sufficient to make informed decisions about
their plans. See S. REP. No. 92-634, at 101 (1971).
82. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1031 (1994).
83. See generally Schaeffer et al., supra note 81 (outlining the primary no-
tice requirements of ERISA).




4. Restrictions on Assignment or Alienation of Plan Assets
ERISA also restricts how plan assets and benefits may be
distributed to plan participants.8 6 Generally, plan participants
may not access plan funds prior to the date of distribution. 87
However, in some instances, plan participants may be eligible
for loans from the plan.88 Section 206(d)(1) of ERISA, which
states that "[elach pension plan shall provide that benefits pro-
vided under the plan may not be assigned or alienated,"89 pre-
vents any plan participant (or anyone else) from assigning or
alienating an interest in the plan.90 This prohibition is fortified
by a corresponding section of the Internal Revenue Code. 91
Section 401(a)(13) of the Code states as a general rule that "[a]
trust shall not constitute a qualified trust under this section
unless the plan of which such trust is a part provides that bene-
fits provided under the plan may not be assigned or alien-
ated."92 In interpreting these provisions, the Supreme Court
consistently has rejected attempts to allow assignment or al-
ienation of plan assets.93 Courts have examined implied
authorization and participant benefit defense against this
regulatory backdrop.
C. AUTHORIZATION AND BENEFIT THEORIES AS PROGENY OF
§ 501(C) OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND
DISCLOSURE ACT
In the absence of clear guidance from § 664 case law, fed-
eral courts have turned to § 501(c) of the Labor-Management
86. See 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d) (1994).
87. See id.
88. See id. § 1108(b). Plan participants may obtain interest-bearing loans
from the plan if certain conditions are met. See id. Generally, the plan docu-
ments must allow such loans and the loan must meet the requirements of 29
U.S.C. § 1108(b).
89. Id. § 1056(d)(1). Note, however, that certain marital debt settlements
may be satisfied through alienation of an employee's share of plan fuids. See
id.
90. See Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753, 759 (1992).
91. See I.R.C. § 401(a)(13) (1994).
92. Id.; see also 26 C.F.R. § 1.401(a)-1413(b)(1) (1999).
93. See, e.g., Patterson, 504 U.S. at 760 (rejecting an attempt to include
plan assets in a bankruptcy estate). For a critique of the anti-alienation pro-
visions, see generally Patricia E. Dilley, Hidden in Plain View: The Pension
Shield Against Creditors, 74 IND. L.J. 355 (1999). Professor Dilley criticizes
the application of the anti-alienation provisions of ERISA. See id. at 356-58
(suggesting the application of the anti-alienation provisions has led to inequi-
table results).
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Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA) to interpret § 664,94 be-
cause both statutes have very similar language and purposes.
95
Section 501(c) of LMRDA prohibits theft and embezzlement
from unions by union officials and those employed by a labor
union.96 In United States v. Andreen,97 the Ninth Circuit held
that § 501(c) could be used to interpret § 664 for two reasons.98
First, both provisions use parallel language to prohibit theft
and embezzlement from entities designed to serve labor.99 Sec-
ond, Congress had similar purposes in mind when passing both
statutes.1l° Since the Andreen decision in 1980, both the Sec-
ond' 01 and Eleventh'0 2 Circuits have recognized that § 501 case
law can be used to construe § 664.103
Like § 664, § 501(c) created a new statutory offense that
went beyond common law larceny and previous embezzlement
94. See, e.g., United States v. Andreen, 628 F.2d 1236, 1242 (9th Cir.
1980); see also Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LIMIRDA) of
1959, 29 U.S.C. § 501(c) (1994).
95. See Brian H. Redmond, Annotation, Validity, Construction and Appli-
cation of § 501(c) of Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29
U.S.C.S. § 501(c), Prohibiting Embezzlement of Union Assets, 85 A.L.R. FED.
803, 809 (1987). Section 501(c) was originally enacted as § 109 of LMRDA.
See S. REP. No. 187, at 42-43 (1959), reprinted in 1959 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2329,
2359. LMRDA created a comprehensive regulatory scheme to curb perceived
corruption and abuses in labor unions. See id.
96. See 29 U.S.C. § 501(c) (1994). Section 501(c) provides:
Any person who embezzles, steals, or unlawfully and willfully ab-
stracts or converts to his own use, or the use of another, any of the
moneys, funds, securities, property, or other assets of a labor organi-
zation of which he is an officer, or by which he is employed, directly or
indirectly, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not
more than five years, or both.
Id.
97. 628 F.2d 1236.
98. The court stated the "prohibitory language of both statutes," referring
to 18 U.S.C. § 664, which makes it a federal crime to embezzle assets of an
employee welfare or pension benefit plan, and to 29 U.S.C. § 501(c), a statute
making it a crime to embezzle assets of a labor organization of which the ac-
cused is an officer or employee, "should be given similar interpretation and be
applied to similar types of conduct." Id. at 1242 (citations omitted).
99. See id. Compare the language of § 664, supra note 11, and § 501(c),
supra note 96.
100. In the passage of both statutes, Congress sought to preserve funds set
aside to benefit workers. See Andreen, 628 F.2d at 1242 (comparing the legis-
lative history of§ 664 and the legislative history of§ 501(c) of LMRDA).
101. See United States v. Nolan, 136 F.3d 265, 269 (2d Cir. 1998).
102. See United States v. Todd, 108 F.3d 1329, 1332 (11th Cir. 1997).
103. Accord Redmond, supra note 95, at 809-10.
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statutes "to encompass nearly every kind of taking."10 4 To es-
tablish a violation of § 501(c), a party must (1) have an appro-
priate relationship to the union,10 5 (2) convert property be-
longing to the union, 0 6 and (3) with specific intent to
appropriate the property. Most circuits have taken the position
that to prove criminal intent, the government must establish
that the defendant voluntarily and knowingly defrauded a un-
ion of its funds. 10 7
Fraudulent intent may be negated in several ways. Some
courts have held that there are two types of offenses under
§ 501(c): "those involving the authorized use of funds and those
involving the unauthorized use of funds." 08 Under the United
States v. Dixon rule, 0 9 when the expenditure is authorized,110
the prosecution must also prove that a union official lacked a
good faith belief that the expenditure or use was for the legiti-
mate benefit of the union."' In another formulation, criminal
104. Id. at 811; see also United States v. Silverman, 430 F.2d 106, 114-15
(2d Cir. 1970) (holding that the passage of 29 U.S.C. § 501(c) went beyond the
common law offense of larceny and the statutory crime of embezzlement by
eliminating the gaps in the prior law); Colella v. United States, 360 F.2d 792,
799 (1st Cir. 1966) (holding that 29 U.S.C. § 501(c) created a new statutory
crime which may be violated in any number of ways); United States v.
Harmon, 339 F.2d 354, 357 (6th Cir. 1964) (holding that 29 U.S.C. § 501(c)
covered almost every kind of taking, whether by larceny, theft, embezzlement
or conversion).
105. Generally, one must be an officer or employee of a labor union. See
United States v. Sullivan, 498 F.2d 146, 151-52 (1st Cir. 1974) (holding an
elected union official liable for embezzlement). However, an independent con-
tractor hired by the union may be held liable for embezzlement. See United
States v. Capanegro, 576 F.2d 973, 976-79 (2d Cir. 1978) (holding an attorney
who had a retainer agreement with a union liable for embezzlement).
106. See United States v. Stockton, 788 F.2d 210, 216 (4th Cir. 1986). Sec-
tion 501(c) broadly defines what is property as "moneys, funds, securities,
property, or other assets of a labor organization." 29 U.S.C. § 501(c) (1994).
The defendant may violate § 501(c) by converting the property to his or her
own use or the use of another. See id. To convert property a person must ex-
ert "dominion or control dominion over the property that seriously interferes
with the owner's rights." Stockton, 788 F.2d at 216.
107. See Redmond, supra note 95, at 827.
108. United States v. Dixon, 609 F.2d 827, 829 (5th Cir. 1980).
109. See id.
110. Generally, for the purposes of § 501(c), "the union itself-its collective
membership" has the power to authorize expenditures. Stockton, 788 F.2d at
217. For the purposes of§ 501(c), the union official giving permission must act
within the scope of his or her fiduciary's powers. See id. (holding a defendant
liable under § 501(c) when the union official authorizing expenditures acted
outside the scope of his official duties).
111. See Dixon, 609 F.2d at 829; see also United States v. Lavergne, 805
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intent may be negated if the union official had a good faith be-
lief that the union had authorized his actions and that his ac-
tions would benefit the union membership." 2
However, the federal circuits have been far from uniform in
applying theories of authorization and union benefit. At least
one court has held that union authorization is not a defense.
113
Other courts have held that when a union official spends funds
on a legitimate union purpose, but without authorization, the
prosecution cannot establish criminal intent.114 One court even
stated that the prosecution must prove both fraudulent intent
and either a lack of benefit to the union or a lack of authoriza-
tion to establish a violation of § 501(c). 115 However, a more
prevalent view is that the prosecution is not required to show
the absence of authorization or benefit. 116 Therefore, in most
F.2d 517, 522-23 (5th Cir. 1986) (noting the Dixon rule and holding that a lack
of good faith defense is not an essential element in the prosecution's case for
misuse of unauthorized funds); United States v. Gibson 675 F.2d 825, 828-29
(6th Cir. 1982) (following the Dixon rule); United States v. Tham, 665 F.2d
855, 858 (9th Cir. 1981) (following the Dixon rule); United States v. Bane, 583
F.2d 832, 835-36 (6th Cir. 1978) (holding in a § 501(c) case that where an ex-
penditure is authorized, the prosecution must prove the defendant's lack of a
good faith belief that the expenditure was for a legitimate benefit of the un-
ion). See generally Redmond, supra note 95, at 833-34.
112. See United States v. Butler, 954 F.2d 114, 118-19 (2d Cir. 1992);
United States v. Santiago, 528 F.2d 1130, 1133-34 (2d Cir. 1976) (holding that
the proper test of a § 501(c) violation is whether defendant had a good faith
belief that funds were being used for union business and that the union would
authorize the expenditures); United States v. Ottley, 509 F.2d 667, 671-72 (2d.
Cir. 1975) (holding that the defendant believed his actions benefited the union
and that the union would authorize such actions, thus no violation of § 501(c)
occurred); cf. United States v. Durnin, 632 F.2d 1297, 1300 (5th Cir. 1980)
(holding no criminal intent existed where a union official had a good faith be-
lief that the funds were expended for the union's benefit and that the expendi-
tures were authorized). See generally Redmond, supra note 95, at 833-34.
113. See United States v. Dibrizzi, 393 F.2d 642, 645 (2d Cir. 1968) (hold-
ing that criminal liability should attach even if the union ratified his actions).
114. See United States v. Silva, 517 F. Supp 727, 738-39 (D.R.I. 1980)
(holding that when the expenditure is for a bona fide union purpose, the de-
fendant is entitled to an acquittal), affd, 644 F.2d 68 (1st Cir. 1981).
115. See United States v. Silverman, 430 F.2d 106, 117 (2d Cir. 1970).
116. See United States v. Cantrell, 999 F.2d 1290, 1292 (8th Cir. 1993)
(holding that a lack of union authorization is not an essential element of a
§ 501(c) violation); United States v. Thordarson, 646 F.2d 1323, 1332 (9th Cir.
1981) (holding that neither a lack of union authorization or benefit are essen-
tial elements of a § 501(c) violation); United States v. Boyle, 482 F.2d 755, 764
(D.C. Cir. 1973) (distinguishing Silverman and holding that the knowing, un-
lawful use of converted union funds constitutes a violation of § 501(c) regard-




jurisdictions, the defense may use authorization and union
benefit to negate a criminal intent;117 however, the prosecution
does not bear the burden of establishing lack of authorization
or union benefit. 18
D. UNITED STATES V. TODD AND UNITED STATES V. NOLAN: THE
RISE OF THE IMPLIED AUTHORIZATION AND PARTICIPANT
BENEFIT DEFENSES IN ERISA PROSECUTIONS IN THE ELEVENTH
AND SECOND CIRCUITS
United States v. Todd119 and United States v. Nolan120
adopted the rationale of the LMRDA decisions and allowed evi-
dence of authorization and participant benefit to be used to ne-
gate specific intent for prosecutions under 18 U.S.C. § 664. In
Todd, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the con-
viction of James Todd and remanded the case for a new trial
because the trial court had barred the introduction of evidence
that supported the contention that the defendant had a good
faith belief that his employees had authorized the diversion of
plan assets. 121 Specifically, Todd was not allowed to offer evi-
dence that his employees were compensated and treated so well
that he had a good faith belief that they had implicitly author-
ized him to use the plan's funds to save his medical equipment
company. 122 In reversing and remanding the case for retrial, a
117. See Redmond, supra note 95, at 836-42.
118. See id. at 841-42.
119. 108 F.3d 1329 (11th Cir. 1997).
120. 136 F.3d 265 (2d Cir. 1998).
121. See Todd, 108 F.3d at 1334. In 1980, James Todd founded Clinical
Medical Equipment, Inc. (CME). See id. at 1329. In 1987, CME adopted a
401(k) pension plan with Todd as sole trustee. See id. at 1330. One of the rea-
sons CME adopted the plan was to attract qualified employees. See id. Under
the terms of the plan, employees could contribute to the plan through payroll
deductions and CME would match a percentage of the employees' contribu-
tions. See id. CME remitted its employees' and CME's matching contribu-
tions in a timely manner until it ran into a financial crisis caused by the negli-
gence of a CME employee. See id. CME employee Mary Rupert failed to file
Dorms 940 ("Employer's Annual Federal Unemployment Tax Return") and 941
("Employer's Quarterly Federal Tax Return") with the IRS. See id. This over-
sight resulted in CME owing more than $680,000 to the IRS. See id. at 1330 &
n.2. At this point, Todd stopped forwarding plan contributions, and instead he
left the funds in CME's general operating account. See id. at 1330. Todd then
used this money to pay off CME's tax liability. See id. From September 1989
to January 1992, Todd withheld more than $100,000 from plan employees'
paychecks, but failed to deposit this money with the plan. See id. Todd was
convicted of embezzlement under 18 U.S.C. § 664. See id. at 1331.
122. See id. at 1333.
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divided panel held that paying high salaries and treating em-
ployees well could tend to demonstrate an employee would have
authorized the diversion of funds.' 23 The Todd court supported
this position by drawing an analogy to the Dixon rule for em-
bezzlement cases prosecuted under § 501(c) of LMRDA. 124
In the following year, the Court of Appeals for the SeconF
Circuit drew a similar analogy to a different line of LMRD.A
cases in Unites States v. Nolan.125 Although the court affirmed
Nolan's conviction for embezzlement under 18 U.S.C. § 644, it
noted in dicta that criminal intent could be negated in twc
ways. 126 First, a good faith belief that the diversion of funds
was authorized or would be authorized could negate intent. 127
Second, a good faith belief that the diversion of funds would
benefit plan participants could negate intent.1 28
II. SHOULD THE IMPLIED AUTHORIZATION AND
PARTICIPANT BENEFIT DEFENSES BE ALLOWED IN
18 U.S.C. § 664 CASES?
The similarities of 18 U.S.C. § 664 and 29 U.S.C. § 501(c)
warrant treating embezzlement prosecutions under the respec-
tive statutes similarly. Both statutes have similar language 129
and both consolidate theft-related offenses into a single statu-
tory violation, through the use of common statutory lan-
guage.' 30 Although the primary purpose of the consolidation of
123. See id. at 1333-34. The court noted that Todd sought to introduce evi-
dence establishing that CME's employees were well compensated (in terms of
salaries and benefits) as compared to others in the relevant labor market. See
id. at 1331, 1333.
124. See id. at 1333. The Todd court would not allow a challenge to the de-
fendant's Dixon defense because the prosecution apparently failed to raise the
issue at the trial court level. See id.; see also supra notes 109-11 and accom-
panying text.
125. 136 F.3d 265, 270 (2d Cir. 1998). The Second Circuit followed two
other Second Circuit cases interpreting 29 U.S.C. § 501(c). See id. These
cases were United States v. Ottley, 509 F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1975), and United
States v. Butler, 954 F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1992). See Nolan, 136 F.3d at 270.
126. See Nolan, 136 F.3d at 270.
127. See id.
128. See id.
129. Compare supra note 11 (quoting the language of 18 U.S.C § 664
(1994)), with supra note 96 (quoting the language of 29 U.S.C. § 501(c) (1994)).
130. Both statutes use the following language, "[amny person who embez-
zles, steals, or unlawfully and willfully abstracts or converts to his own use or
the use of another .... " Compare supra note 11 (quoting the language of 18
U.S.C § 664), with supra note 96 (quoting the language of 29 U.S.C. § 501(c)).
20001 1855
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
these offenses is for administrative convenience, 131 the substan-
tive elements of the specific offenses remain the same.132 The
only difference between these statutes is that the assets 133 and
the parties subject to prosecution under the statute differ. 134
The congressional purposes of both statutes are closely re-
lated135 since both provisions are meant to deter the abuses
found within the respective arenas and to preserve designated
funds for their entitled beneficiaries. 136
. Given this similarity, it would be reasonable to expect that
the LMRDA authorization and benefit theories should also ap-
ply to § 664 prosecutions. Although Nolan and Todd courts
followed the LMRDA rules closely, the Mett court rejected this
approach. The Todd and Nolan courts mechanically applied
authorization and benefit rules from the LMRDA cases without
reference to ERISA.137 In contrast, the Mett court applied the
authorization and benefit rules from the LMRDA cases with an
additional interpretive layer. The Mett decision rejected these
defenses by using the strict regulatory framework of ERISA to
bar their application. 138 This contrast calls into question what
role a civil statute should play in interpreting the application of
the criminal code.
131. See 3 TORCIA, supra note 11, at 443 (stating that the purpose of statu-
tory consolidation is to simplify the pleading of this type of offense and avoid
technicalities in pleading).
132. See id. at 443-44.
133. Compare supra note 11 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 664), with supra note 96
(quoting 29 U.S.C. § 501(c)). 29 U.S.C. § 501 provides, "any of the moneys,
funds, securities, property, or other assets of a labor organization," 29 U.S.C.
§ 501(c) (1994) (emphasis added), while 18 U.S.C § 664 adds some additional
terms: "any of the moneys, funds, securities, premiums, credits, property, or
other assets of any employee welfare benefit plan or employee pension benefit
plan, or of any fund connected therewith ... ." 18 U.S.C. § 664 (1994) (empha-
sis added).
134. See supra note 133. To violate § 501(c), the asset must be taken from
a labor union. See 29 U.S.C. § 501(c). To violate § 664, the asset must be
taken from an employee pension plan or an employee welfare benefit plan or
any fund connected with any such plans. See 18 U.S.C. § 664.
135. Both statutes were enacted as part of a comprehensive regulatory
scheme to curb perceived abuse in unions and employee pension plans respec-
tively. See supra notes 3, 95.
136. See Redmond, supra note 95, at 808-09.
137. See United States v. Nolan, 136 F.3d 265, 270 (2d Cir. 1998); United
States v. Todd, 108 F.3d 1329, 1333 (11th Cir. 1997); see also text accompa-
nying supra notes 123, 127.
138. See generally supra notes 1-20 and accompanying text (discussing the
Mett case).
1856 [Vol. 84:1837
DEFENSES TO ERISA CRIMES
A. THE CULPABILITY OF METT MAY EXPLAIN THE DIFFERENCE
IN ANALYTICAL APPROACH
In many respects, William Mett was much more culpable
than James Todd.139 CAG's financial difficulties occurred due
to the criminal activities of Mett and Wiseman, 140 while Todd's
financial crisis was created by an employee oversight. 141 Fur-
ther, Mett and Wiseman drew such exorbitant salaries
($378,000 and $500,000 respectively) that over one-half of the
money taken from the pension plan found its way into Mett and
Wiseman's pockets. 142 In contrast, Todd applied the funds to
pay an outstanding business tax liability.143 Todd also appro-
priated the funds in a different manner than Mett. Todd with-
held money from his employee's paychecks but failed to forward
the funds to the pension plan.'" Mett withdrew the money
from the employee's pension fund itself.145 While Mett clearly
took from the employee pension plan, the money involved in
Todd was never segregated from the company's operating capi-
tal. Mett simply appeared much more culpable than Todd and
therefore, presented a poor factual setting in which to support
the implied authorization and participant benefit defenses.
Had Mett been allowed to present these defenses at trial, the
attempt would have been largely misled the jury, given his
level of culpability. Accordingly, it was not surprising that the
Mett court strictly construed the civil regulations of ERISA to
eliminate these defenses.
B. THE NINTH CIRcurr APPROACH: STRICT APPLICATION OF
ERISA EXCLUDES THE DEFENSES
1. Authorization Defense
The Mett decision rejected the authorization defense be-
cause it found the defense was contrary to the civil regulations
139. The Nolan decision is not addressed in this section because the
authorization and benefits defenses were not applied to the facts of that case.
See Nolan, 136 F.3d at 270 (stating that the jury was properly instructed, and
thus the district court did not err).
140. See supra note 6.
141. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
142. See supra note 13.
143. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
144. The funds in question never left the general operating account of
CME. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
145. See supra text accompanying note 7.
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of ERISA. The court's primary line of argument posited that a
diversion of funds from a pension plan could never be author-
ized as a matter of law. According to the court, plan benefici-
aries lack the power to authorize taking money'from the plan
because ERISA's regulatory provisions prohibit employees from
alienating or assigning their interests in the plan. 146 Thus,
ERISA fiduciaries can never have a good faith belief that tak-
ing money from the plan is authorized, because plan benefici-
aries do not have the power to authorize the transfer. Under
the Mett rationale, neither an express nor an implied authoriza-
tion defense can be established when the source of the authori-
zation is an employee. 147
Essentially, the Mett court tied the mental state of the de-
fendant to the ERISA regulatory environment. Under the Mett
court's reasoning, the defendant can never negate criminal in-
tent with the implied authorization defense because it is a mis-
take of law to believe that employees can authorize a loan from
the plan to operate the business. 148 The Mett court premised its
ruling on the idea that a defendant's mental state cannot ne-
gate criminal intent when that belief violates the provisions or
policies of ERISA.149 Restated, under this rationale, a court
would disallow any defense that implicated a violation of a civil
regulatory scheme.
If such a theory is valid, the implied authorization defense
should apply only in very limited circumstances in 18 U.S.C.
§ 664 prosecutions. To understand this result, it is first neces-
sary to briefly revisit the LMRDA cases to gain a better under-
standing of the tenets of the authorization defense. LMRDA
cases hold that the authorization must come from the proper
source to establish a good faith belief that expenditure is
authorized. 150 Under § 501(c), individual union members gen-
erally cannot authorize the expenditure. 151 Rather, only the
collective membership or a union official acting within the
146. See United States v. Mett, 178 F.3d 1058, 1068 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating
that ERISA plans must "contain an 'anti-alienation' provision").
147. See id.; see also supra note 19 and accompanying text.
148. See Mett, 178 F.3d at 1068.
149. See id.
150. See supra note 110 (noting that an expenditure cannot be authorized
under § 501(c) of LMRDA unless the authorization came from the collective
union membership or from a union official acting within the scope of his/her
fiduciary duty).
151. See supra notes 104-07 and accompanying text; see also supra note 10
and accompanying text.
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scope of his fiduciary duties can make a valid authorization for
the purposes of § 501(c).' 52 Accordingly, proper sources of
authorization must be found under ERISA to set up a valid
authorization defense under § 664.
Unfortunately for defendants such as Mett, sources of
authorization in the ERISA regulatory environment are few
and far between. Generally, plan participants do not have the
power to authorize loans from the plan to the employer.153 Plan
participants are extremely limited in their ability to access
funds, due to ERISA restrictions.1 5 4 Plan participants are
banned from assigning or alienating their interests by both the
terms of the retirement plan documents' 55 and the provisions of
ERISA.' 56 Generally, ERISA bans loans to an employer as a
conflict of interest transaction. 57 The only methods by which a
"loan" could be "authorized" is either through a grant of an ex-
emption by the Secretary of Labor under section 408(a) of
ERISA or a qualified exemption under section 408(b).158 A fi-
duciary or plan sponsor in Mett's position could not have
claimed an administrative exemption from the Secretary of La-
bor because he failed to follow the administrative procedures.
However, in very narrow circumstances, 159 a fiduciary could ar-
gue that the transaction was authorized if it were exempt un-
der section 408(b)(1).' 60
To argue for a section 408(b)(1) exemption, the defendant
must establish that he believed his employees would have bor-
rowed from the pension plan and then transferred those funds
152. See supra notes 104-07 and accompanying text; see also supra note 10
and accompanying text.
153. See supra text accompanying notes 77-79.
154. See supra text accompanying notes 86-90.
155. See supra text accompanying notes 91-92.
156. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
157. See supra text accompanying notes 76-78.
158. See ERISA § 408(a)-(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1108(a)-(b) (1994) (discussing
grants of exemptions by the Secretary and enumerated exemptions); see also
supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
159. This argument will have a very limited applicability to only defined
contribution plans.
160. See ERISA § 408(b)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1108(b)(1) (discussing an enumer-
ated exemption for certain loans to parties in interest). This exemption only
applies to defined contribution plans. See id. Accordingly, defined benefit
plans are excluded from the following discussion. Note that this argument
had no applicability to the Mett case because Mett converted funds from a de-
fined benefit plan. See supra note 3.
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to the employer. 61 Three elements need to be established to
make this argument. First, the plan documents must authorize
loans from the pension plan to its participants. 62 Second, the
defendant must establish that he had a good faith belief that
each employee would have obtained such a loan and trans-
ferred those funds to the employer. 63 Third, the loans must
not otherwise violate the provisions of section 408(b)(1). 164
While this argument is a theoretical possibility, there has been
no case law applying it, and the elements appear difficult to
prove in most situations. Therefore, the authorization defense
will apply only under limited circumstances when § 664 is read
in light of the provisions of ERISA.
Implied authorization also is difficult to sustain under the
Mett rationale because the substance of implied authorization
means that the defendant fails to disclose the diversion of plan
assets. In contrast, ERISA obligates fiduciaries and plan spon-
sors to promptly disclose information about plan transactions
to their employees and the government. 165 In Mett, Todd and
Nolan, the defendants did not disclose the diversion of funds
and subsequently argued that the employees would have acqui-
esced to the diversion had they been notified. 66 Therefore, the
implied authorization defense offered in these cases violated
the ERISA regulations that require disclosure. 67 In sum, the
validity of the implied authorization is doubtful if ERISA's poli-
cies and provisions are strictly applied.
161. See 29 U.S.C. § 1108(b)(1).
162. See id. § 1108(b)(1)(C).
163. To have proper belief in authorization by his or her employees, the fi-
duciary or plan sponsor must believe that each employee, if asked, would have
completed all the steps necessary to have a proper section 408(b) loan. With-
out this, the government could establish that the defendant converted funds
attributable to an employee unwilling to authorize the diversion of funds by
the defendant. Therefore, the defendant must first establish that each em-
ployee would have properly taken out the loans, then retransferred the funds
to the employer.
164. See 29 U.S.C. § 1108(b)(1). In addition, the loans from defined contri-
bution plans must bear a reasonable rate of interest and be adequately se-
cured. See id.
165. See supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text (describing disclosure
requirements, identifying the sections of ERISA requiring disclosure, and out-
lining the policies served by ERISA's disclosure requirements).
166. See supra notes 8, 14-15, 121 and accompanying text; see also United
States v. Nolan, 136 F.3d 265, 268 (2d Cir. 1998).
167. But see United States v. Dixon, 609 F.2d 827, 829 (5th Cir. 1980) (al-
lowing a good faith belief in authorization even though LMRDA has disclosure
requirements similar to that of ERISA).
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2. Participant Benefit Theory
While Mett's authorization argument may be consistent
with provisions of ERISA, the opinion is more vulnerable to at-
tack in its rejection of the participant benefit defense. Mett
held that the participant benefit defense could not be made
when embezzlement involves an employee pension plan subject
to ERISA.168 According to the court, once funds enter an
ERISA pension plan, they are "committed to securing a par-
ticular long-term benefit-the payment of pension benefits."1 69
They may not be used for any other purpose than to secure
long-term retirement benefits. °70 The court argued that con-
tinued employment is only a short-term benefit that cannot be
pursued with plan funds. 171 The Mett court premised this ar-
gument on the following language, "We are confident that Con-
gress, by imposing strict fiduciary responsibilities on ERISA
trustees and enacting 18 U.S.C. § 664, meant to impose crimi-
nal liability on employers who willfully arrogate to themselves
the authority to sacrifice an employee's pension in favor of
short-term benefits of their own devising."17 2
Although the Mett court's analysis of the participant benefit
theory is abridged compared to the implied authorization the-
ory, the rationale is the same. For the Mett court, a federal law
(ERISA) provided the objective standard to judge the reason-
ableness of the defendant's state of mind. If a defendant's state
of mind implicates a violation of the regulatory rules of ERISA
(no matter how insubstantial), the defense cannot be sustained.
The Mett court's long-term benefit versus short-term bene-
fit argument is tenuous, at best. Although ERISA sets strict
fiduciary standards, the statutory framework only requires
that the fiduciary have a good faith belief that he or she is act-
ing in the best interest of the employees. Plan fiduciaries are
mandated to act "solely in the interest of' plan participants and
beneficiaries.173 While the fiduciary has an undivided duty of
loyalty, nothing in the statutory framework suggests that a fi-
duciary cannot have a good faith belief that she is acting in the









best interest of the plan beneficiaries when procuring short-
term employment benefits rather than retirement benefits.
3. What Are the Implications of the Mett Rationale?
Under a strict application of the Mett rational, the implied
authorization defense should fail, but the participant benefit
defense should remain theoretically viable, because Mett's legal
analysis is subject to credible attack. However, the ability of a
defendant to establish a valid defense will vary from circuit to
circuit depending on what variation of the authorization-benefit
rule a court adopts. 74 If a court adopts the Dixon rule or a
similar rule requiring the defendant to establish both authori-
zation and benefit, the defendant will have no argument. 175
However, if courts adopt a LMRDA rule where either authori-
zation or benefit may be used to negate specific intent, defen-
dants have at least a tenable avenue of defense under a par-
ticipant benefit theory.' 76
The application of the Mett rationale is problematic in sev-
eral ways. Ultimately, it is disconcerting to note that § 501(c)
of LMRDA and § 664 of the criminal code punish nearly identi-
cal behavior and contain the same substantive elements; yet, in
§ 501(c) cases, defendants are allowed a greater opportunity to
negate specific intent, as compared to § 664 prosecutions under
Mett. This is an incongruous result given the similarity of the
regulatory framework of LMRDA and ERISA.177 Because both
statutes are similar in language, structure and purpose, it is
difficult to reconcile this difference in the ability of a defendant
to negate specific intent.
174. Compare supra note 111 and accompanying text (outlining the re-
quirements for the Dixon formulation of the authorization-benefit defense),
with supra note 112 and accompanying text (outlining the Ottley formulation
of the authorization-benefit), and supra note 113 and accompanying text
(stating the Dibrizzi rule that union authorization does not negate intent).
175. See supra text accompanying note 111 (stating the rule of United
States v. Dixon).
176. See supra note 114 and accompanying text (noting that the Silva court
held that when the expenditure is for a bona fide union purpose, the defendant
is entitled to an acquittal).
177. See supra text accompanying notes 129-30 (noting that both statutes
have similar language and consolidate theft-related offenses into a single
statutory violation); supra text accompanying note 132 (stating that the ele-
ments to establish a violation of each statute are substantively the same); su-
pra note 135 and accompanying text (noting that both statutes were enacted
as part of comprehensive regulatory schemes to curb perceived abuses against
workers).
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While the Mett methodology may have been an intellectual
shortcut to the right result, the conviction of Mett and Wise-
man, its rigid form ignores the actual culpability of the defen-
dant. The Mett decision has reduced the scienter requirement
from a standard of conversion with fraudulent intent178 to
merely willfully diverting plan assets. Once it is established
the defendant willfully converted plan assets, any further evi-
dence of intent is irrelevant, because the Mett methodology ap-
plies a civil regulation to eliminate any further inquiry.
C. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH: THE TODD-NOLAN RULE
In many respects, the Todd and Nolan decisions implicitly
reject the Mett method of statutory interpretation. Todd and
Nolan suggest that the authorization and participant benefit
defenses should be applied by direct analogy to the LMRDA
cases without reference to the regulations and underlying poli-
cies of ERISA. Todd accepted the validity of the Dixon defense
without allowing the prosecution to challenge the validity of the
defense in the context of § 664.179 Similarly, Nolan incorpo-
rated the Second Circuit's LMDRA authorization benefit rule in
a § 664 prosecution without reference to ERISA. Todd and
Nolan seem to suggest that civil regulations under ERISA have
no place in determining criminal culpability under § 664. The
only limitations placed on negating intent are the good faith
belief of the defendant and the formulation of the authoriza-
tion-benefit rule chosen by the federal jurisdiction in question.
A strict application of the Todd-Nolan approach would remove
the ERISA regulatory framework from the analysis. Such an
approach also seems unwise, because a defendant's knowledge
that he is violating a civil provision bears on his actual intent.
D. A COMPROMISE POSITION: ERISA REGULATION AS A FACTOR
IN DETERMINING REASONABLENESS OF THE AUTHORIZATION-
BENEFIT DEFENSE.
In many respects, the Mett and Todd approaches each ap-
pear to be too absolute. The factfinder's job is to discern the
state of mind of a reasonable employer caught in a financial
bind. The Mett approach, on the one hand, seems too hard on
the well-meaning defendant, while the Todd approach seems
178. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (discussing the intent re-
quirement).
179. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
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too liberal for individuals with the culpability of William Mett.
Although it is true that mere ignorance of a criminal statute is
not a defense, an unintentional violation of the provisions of a
complex, civil regulatory scheme should not by itself establish
criminal intent. Such logic is little more than bootstrapping.
On the other hand, employers should not be able to negate
criminal intent when they willfully violate the provisions of a
civil statute. Accordingly, a compromise between the Mett and
Todd positions may be the best solution.
This compromise alternative was implied in United States
v. Snyder.80 In that case, the Second Circuit endorsed the
proposition that standards of civil liability may bear on estab-
lishing criminal intent.'81 The Snyder court cautioned that a
defendant should not be convicted merely because he breached
his fiduciary duties. 182 Rather, the Snyder court recognized
that regulatory schemes set objective standards of conduct,
which could help the factfinder to discern the defendant's in-
tent.1 83 According to the court, Snyder's duties as a fiduciary 184
and his knowledge of his responsibilities were relevant to es-
tablishing his state of mind. 185 This approach eliminates the
frailty of the Mett rule by allowing the regulatory framework to
inform the fact-finding process, without acting as an absolute
bar to recognized defenses. In embezzlement cases, civil duties
under ERISA could be used as another factor to determine the
specific intent of the defendant.
Using the regulatory context to inform the fact-finding pro-
cess also cures Nolan and Todd's failure to examine how the
regulatory environment bears on a defendant's intent. This
180. United States v. Snyder, 668 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1982). Jacob Snyder
was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 664 of embezzling over $1 million from union
pension and welfare benefit funds. See id. at 687-89.
181. See id. at 690-91. Snyder appealed his criminal conviction by main-
taining that the government had used the standard of civil liability as a basis
of imposing criminal liability. See id at 690. The prosecution introduced evi-
dence that Snyder had known about his fiduciary duties under 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1104, 1106, 1108, and consciously violated those duties. See id. The Second
Circuit rejected Snyder's arguments. See id. at 691. The Snyder court held
that the defendant's knowledge of his responsibilities under ERISA was rele-
vant to establishing his state of mind. See id.
182. See id.
183. See id.
184. See id. The court pointed out that Snyder had a duty as an ERISA
fiduciary to act "solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries.'"
See id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)).
185. See id.
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approach has the advantage (or disadvantage) of eliminating
the absolute bar on the authorization-benefit rule for less cul-
pable employers who never gain any personal benefit from the
diversion of funds. This would also tend to mitigate the DOJ's
policy of prosecuting business owners and fiduciaries irrespec-
tive of whether they garner any personal gain from the diver-
sion of funds.186
An example of this compromise approach might work as
follows: Suppose a small business owner has a sudden cash
flow crisis. The business maintains a retirement plan subject
to ERISA. The plan is funded exclusively by monthly employer
contributions. The current owner has little experience in busi-
ness because she inherited the business from her deceased
husband after she had previously been a homemaker. Due to
the owner's inexperience, the business is unable to meet its ex-
penses and cannot obtain credit advances from the bank. In-
stead, the bank calls the company's note. If a payment is not
made immediately, the business will fold. In desperation, the
owner stops making monthly pension contributions. She plans
to repay the contribution in ninety days, because she believes
cash flow will improve. The owner also believes that her em-
ployees need their jobs due to a local recession. Because of the
loyalty of her staff during past cash flow problems, she also be-
lieves they would authorize the loan from the pension but does
not ask permission. Unfortunately, the business fails sixty
days later after the bank repossesses its equipment. Two
months later, the Department of Justice convenes a grand jury
and the business owner is indicted for embezzlement under 18
U.S.C. § 664.
If Mett controlled, the business owner would be convicted of
a federal felony. With the compromise position, however, the
defendant would be much less likely to be convicted. She could
use her lack of knowledge of the ERISA standards to help es-
tablish her good faith belief that her employees would have
authorized the diversion. She could also argue that her em-
ployees benefited through continued employment. While ex-
tensive civil penalties may be appropriate for her error, it
seems inequitable to criminally penalize the hypothetical busi-
ness owner in the same manner as William Mett.
186. See id.
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CONCLUSION
Currently the federal courts are divided over how to prop-
erly address implied authorization and participant benefits de-
fenses under § 664 prosecutions. The Ninth Circuit's approach,
as evidenced in Mett, is in many respects too conservative be-
cause is does not allow a good faith belief to negate criminal in-
tent no matter how favorable the facts. Under Mett, ERISA's
regulatory framework is an absolute bar to negating intent
through authorization or participant benefit. On the other
hand, the approaches adopted in the Eleventh and Second Cir-
cuits in Todd and Nolan ignore the regulatory responsibilities
placed on ERISA fiduciaries. The circuits should resolve the
two lines of cases through a compromise solution in which the
ERISA regulatory framework becomes a factor to be considered
in the fact-finding process. Although civil regulation should not
be the basis for criminal liability itself, such regulation has a
bearing on the state of mind of the defendant.
